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Summary
Starting from the macro-economic processes of public finance, this article examines 
the road to reaching financial stability and sustainable economic growth. It outlines 
the role played by rule-based budgeting in this process. It introduces the regulatory 
and institutional solutions and explains how, as a logical consequence of being part 
of a framework, this service can become a useful aspect of financial policy by imple-
menting the respective regulations of the system and of annual budgetary practice. 
It reaches the conclusion that “elevating” the major stipulations of the rule-based 
budget framework and the operational rules of the institution safeguarding the im-
plementation into the Fundamental Law of Hungary in 2001 was unavoidable from 
the aspect of strengthening fiscal responsibility.  The article deals with the linkages 
of the Stability Act, the major characteristics of the work done by the Fiscal Council 
and the body’s recommendations made in the last few years. Finally, it illustrates with 
some data the improvement of fiscal (public finance) stability supported by rule-based 
budgeting.
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Introduction – The essence of rule-based budgeting
It is common knowledge that in the course of implementation of the goals of fiscal 
policy in order to reach a lasting position of near budgetary (public finance) balance 
position and the financial viability of social services, it is of decisive importance to 
maintain the measure of state redistribution at the level required to reaching these 
goals. The maintenance of state redistribution at the required level is also a primary 
condition for the regional and global competitiveness of the entire national economy, 
both from the aspect of the long-term decrease of government debt and also, ulti-
mately, in terms of the sustainability of socioeconomic development. 
Lack of financial stability paralyses, or can paralyse, the social-economic function-
ing of a country within a few years. That is why regaining and maintaining this stability 
has become a strategic issue across the globe and has required new solutions, rules 
and institutions. The so-called rule-based fiscal policy framework that was first applied in 
the economic crisis-ridden states of Latin America and then, from the 1980s onward 
worldwide, and thus also in Europe, fits this target system (Kutasi, 2012).
The so-called “rule-based fiscal policy” means more than the regulatory compli-
ance2 of the preparation and implementation of budgeting, as this dictates the fiscal 
responsibility framework via the rules of budgetary policy, procedural-transparency 
regulations and – additionally – via the institutional mechanisms that represent the 
guarantee of observing these rules (Kutasi, 2012).  The system used in practice is 
made up from these regulations and mechanisms – in harmony with the specific fea-
tures of the given country (Ódor, 2014). 
From the middle of the 2000s it became obvious in Hungary too that in order to 
prevent expenditure overruns that diverged from economic performance it was not 
enough simply to be more disciplined when it came to the implementation of the 
current budget. Regaining and maintaining financial stability became a strategic issue 
that required new constitutional stipulations that uniformly regulate public money 
matters and high level legal norms that rely on these new stipulations. The Hungarian 
efforts to put the finances of the country on a solid basis from the second half of the 
past decade, together with the cessation of expenditure overruns, successfully served 
this purpose when, five years ago, these goals were incorporated in the Fundamental 
Law of Hungary3 and institutionalised in the Stability Act4. 
This article focuses on introducing these regulations and is then followed by a 
detailed analysis of the road to regaining fiscal stability.  
Sketchy international outlook
Reasons for introduction and principles of rule-based budgetary practice as a therapy
Expenditure overruns have occurred in a long line of emerging and developed coun-
tries in the past few decades and, as a consequence, the problem of sustainability and 
growing debt has been accompanied by bank crises5 (Antal, 2004; Bod, 2013; Győrffy, 
2009; Muraközy, 2010).  
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Governments of several countries chose to introduce rule-based budgeting in the 
hope that it could help to confine balance-related tensions and create lasting finance- 
ability, growth and sustainable development. To this end, they incorporated into con-
stitutional stipulations the proportions of the expenditure and revenue sides of the 
budget as well as the acceptable degree of indebtedness – in the form of numerical 
regulations, planned alongside a set rule of procedures and institutionally controlling 
the budget (Kopits, 2007; 2013). 
In practice this meant that they:
– are employing fiscal policy regulations (for example, identifying expenditure 
ceilings to maintain a balanced budget), 
– introduced fiscal-procedural regulations (for example, medium-term budget 
planning, and the obligatory compensation of expenditures), 
– validated transparency norms (for example, accrual approach accounting, and 
reporting systems), 
– established institutional guarantees to promote transparency and the observance 
of regulations and their macro- and micro-economic “supervision” (for example 
alongside the Supreme Audit Institution of the given country or – possibly within this 
institution – the operation of a parliamentary organisation and/or fiscal council that 
gives an opinion on the budget and that is independent from the government).
International experiences of applying this system have shown that its consistent 
operation could reverse the trend that throughout the last decades has been mani-
fested in a long line of emerging and developed countries in the form of budgetary 
over-spending, the unsustainability of the budget and the growing government debt 
(Oblath–Szapáry, 2006).
Solutions in international practice
Some countries had already introduced rule-based budgeting before the 2008 crisis 
and they established independent fiscal institutions (see Table 1).6
It is apparent that they were using elements of the rule-based method in very dif-
ferent ways (Jankovics, 2012). Most frequently, however, the general balance require-
ments emerge and we can also find more concrete stipulations, such as setting a limit 
(ceiling) concerning indebtedness and calling for medium-range planning (Kopits, 
2013). The method of calling for an independent institution can be different as well: 
in most cases it occurred with a simple law or political guideline (agreement), but in 
the case of Poland, for example, it was through the constitution. The countries of the 
euro area fixed the requirements in an agreement.7 
A diverse picture has also enfolded in the EU Member States in the period following 
the 2008 crisis. From the “picture taken” on 1 January 2016, we have separately exam-
ined the individual countries belonging to the groups that accessed the EU before 
2004 (see Table 2a and 2b) and those that accessed the EU from 2004 onwards (see 
Table 3a and 3b) (Adema, 2008). As a consequence of the crisis, the number of coun-
tries that have introduced the stipulations of rule-based budgeting has also increased 
among the countries that had accessed the EU earlier.8 
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Table 1:  Functions and responsibilities of independent fiscal institutions guarding the observance 
of rule-based budgeting in the EU Member States prior to the 2008 financial crisis
Country DK BE LV SE BG EE PL UK
Date of the introduc-
tion of fiscal rule
1962 1989 1990
1997–98, 
2007
1998 1998 1998 1998
Fiscal 
political 
rule
Deficit limit X
Structural surplus 
or deficit
X X
Expenditure limit X X
Current balance X
General balance X X X X
Efficacy studies
Medium-term plan-
ning
X X
Debt limit X X
Stabilisation fund X X
Authority
Public finance level X X X X X X X X
National (central, 
federal)
X
Sub-national 
governments
X X
Basis of 
establish-
ment
Constitution X
Law X X X X
International agree-
ment
Political guideline, 
agreement
X X X X
Public 
law rating
Independent or par-
liamentary organisa-
tion
X X X X X  X X
Belonging to the 
executive branch
 X
Sanctions 
IFIs can 
use
Veto right
Loss of reputation X X X X X X X X
Legal X
Financial
Abbreviations of the listed countries: DK – Denmark, BE – Belgium, LV – Latvia, SE – Sweden, BG – 
Bulgaria, EE – Estonia PL – Poland, UK – United Kingdom
Source: DG-ECFIN/IFI websites/Kopits, 2007; 2013/the author’s compilation 
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Table 2a:  Functions and responsibilities of independent fiscal institutions safeguarding the 
observance of budgeting on 1 January 2016 in the EU-15 country group
Country SE UK FR DE IE PT
Date of the introduction 
of fiscal rule
1997–98,
2007
1998, 
2010
2013 2010 2011 2012
Fiscal 
political 
rule
Deficit limit X X X
Structural surplus or 
deficit
X
Primary expenditure limit X
Current balance X
General balance X X X X
Efficacy studies
Medium-term planning X
Debt limit X X
Sustainability
Author-
ity
Public finance level X X X X X X
National (central, federal)  X X X X X X
Sub-national governments X X
Basis of 
estab-
lishment
Constitution X
Law X X X X
International agreement
Political guideline, agree-
ment
X X
Public 
law 
rating
Independent or parlia-
mentary organisation
X X X X X X
Belonging to the executive 
branch
Sanc-
tions 
IFIs can 
use
Veto right
Loss of reputation X X X X X X
Legal X
Financial
Abbreviations of the individual countries: SE – Sweden, UK – United Kingdom, FR – France, DE – Ger-
many, IE – Ireland, PT – Portugal – fiscal rules recommended by the EU for the countries of the euro area
Source: DG-ECFIN/IFI websites/Kopits 2007; 2013/the author’s compilation 
44
Árpád Kovács: Rule-Based Budgeting: The Road to Budget Stability
Table 2b:  Functions and responsibilities of independent fiscal institutions safeguarding the 
observance of budgeting on 1 January 2016 in the EU-15 country group
Country FI DK BE AT* NL EZ
Date of the introduction 
of fiscal rule
2010
1962, 
2010
1989 2012 1945 2015
Fiscal 
political 
rule
Deficit limit X
Structural surplus or deficit
Primary expenditure limit
Current balance
General balance X X X X X X
Efficacy studies X
Medium-term planning X X
Debt limit X X
Sustainability X
Authority
Public finance level X X X X X X
National (central, federal) X X X X X X
Sub-national governments X X X
Basis of 
establish-
ment
Constitution
Law X X X X X
International agreement X
Political guideline, agreement
Public law 
rating
Independent or parliamentary 
organisation
X X X X X X
Belonging to the executive 
branch
Sanctions 
IFIs can 
use
Veto right
Loss of reputation X X X X X
Legal
Financial X
Abbreviations of the individual countries: FI – Finland, DK – Denmark, BE – Belgium, AT – Austria, NL 
– The Netherlands, IT – Italy, EZ – fiscal rules recommended by the EU for the countries of the euro area
Source: DG-ECFIN/IFI websites/Kopits 2007; 2013/the author’s compilation 
*In Austria there are two institutions operating, one is Fiskalrat (Fiscal Council) functioning on the 
technological background of the Central Bank of Austria, the other is Budgetdienst (the Fiscal Council of 
the Parliament)
We have to note that in October 2015 the European Commission established the 
Independent Fiscal Institution of the Union, the European Fiscal Board9, as an opinion-giving 
body that plays an advisory role. Its activities, mandates and examinations were limited to 
the countries of the euro area. According to the resolution, the new body will work inde-
pendently from the national and European institutions, but in cooperation with them.10 
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Table 3a:  Functions and responsibilities of independent fiscal institutions safeguarding 
the observance of budgeting on 1 January 2016 in the countries of the EU-13 
country group (encompassing the countries that accessed the EU in the period of 
enlargement, 2004–2013) 
Country BG EE CY PL* LV LT
Date of the introduction of fiscal 
rule
1998 1998 2014 1998 1990 2014
Fiscal politi-
cal rule
Deficit limit X
Stabilisation fund X X
Primary expenditure limit X
General balance X X X X X
Debt limit X
Sustainability X X
Authority
Public finance level X X X X X X
National (central, federal)  X X X X X X
Sub-national governments X
Basis of 
establish-
ment
Constitution X X
Law X X X
Political, agreement X X
Public law 
rating
Independent or parliamentary 
organisation
X X X X X
Belonging to the executive 
branch
X
Sanctions 
IFIs can use
Veto power
Loss of reputation X X X X X X
Legal X X
*The IFI of Poland that is functioning as a governmental organisation has been “accepted” by the OECD 
as part of the group of such organisations by inviting them to their meetings. However, the EU does not 
regard it as an independent fiscal institution and the Poles do not get invitations to the so-called ECFIN 
meetings 
Source: DG-ECFIN/IFI websites, Kopits 2007; 2013/the author’s compilation 
Twelve of the 13 countries that accessed the EU in 2004 or later, operate rule-based 
fiscal regulatory mechanisms, together with the independent institutional guarantees 
ensuring the observance of these rules. The system was already set up prior to the 
outbreak of the 2008 crisis in four countries while in another five – among them in 
Hungary – it was introduced in the period 2009–2012.11 
The picture is mixed with respect to the utilisation of the elements of rule-based 
budgeting as well as the functions and responsibilities of the individual fiscal institu-
tions.12 One “novelty”, however, stands out and this concerns us. This is the applica-
tion of the veto right (we will deal with this in more detail later).
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Table 3b:  Functions and responsibilities of independent fiscal institutions safeguarding 
the observance of budgeting on 1 January 2016 in the countries of the EU-13 
country group (encompassing the countries that accessed the EU in the period of 
enlargement, 2004–2013) 
Country HU HR MT RO SK SL
Date of the introduction of fiscal 
rule
2009 2011 2015 2010 2012 2009
Fiscal politi-
cal rule
Deficit limit
Stabilisation fund
Primary expenditure limit
General balance X X X X X
Debt limit X X X X X
Sustainability X X
Authority
Public finance level X X X X X X
National (central, federal) X X X X X X
Sub-national governments
Basis of 
establish-
ment
Constitution X X
Law X X X X
Political, agreement X
Public law 
rating
Independent or parliamentary 
organisation
X X X X X X
Belonging to the executive 
branch
Sanctions 
IFIs can use
Veto power X
Loss of reputation X X X X X X
Legal X
Source: DG-ECFIN/IFI websites, Kopits 2007; 2013/the author’s compilation
Let us end the rather sketchy international outlook with the question of whether 
financial management has become more disciplined in the budget sector with the entry of 
the fiscal rules and institutions (fiscal councils). It is a fact that in the majority of the 
countries, following the introduction of a stricter system, the rate of government debt 
began to decrease (see Figure 1), and economic growth also started, more powerfully 
in the group of the Visegrád countries. Although the financial system of some South-
ern European states can, from time to time, be operated with the help of their own 
“forced solidarity”, the practise of rule-based budgeting has brought certain results 
here too. 
Accordingly, we can clearly reach the conclusion that the strengthening effect on 
discipline of favourable, problem-solving financial management can be demonstrat-
ed. This can be directly experienced mainly in the gradual relief of the burden of 
indebtedness. We should note, however, that the degree of the contribution of rule-
based budgeting to the strengthening of fiscal stability strongly depends on the ability 
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Figure 1:  Government debt to GDP of certain member states of the European Union and the 
date of creation of their independent fiscal institutions
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Source: EUROSTAT, 2014–2016: Forecasts based on the National Convergence Programmes
of society and the political leadership to recognise the capacity, socio-economic will 
and, naturally, the authorisations in constitutional law of the institutions safeguarding 
the observance of this set of rules.13 
Domestic fiscal policy in the past decade and a half
Problems in managing public finance and the human factor
First of all, let us see why and how we reached the recognition in the middle of the 
2000s that, in order to establish stability in fiscal (budgetary) policy in Hungary it 
was unavoidable to introduce stricter regulations and the consequent control of their 
functioning.  
After the turn of the millennium it was not only Hungary that was facing more and 
more unmanageable public finances, overspending and, as a consequence, deepening 
problems of indebtedness that led to the undermining of the financial stability of the 
country. However, the situation was different for us in that the overlap of the political 
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and economic cycles and the processes through which they strengthened or weakened 
each other – the effort to maximise votes – have resulted in expenditure overruns and 
the ensuing indebtedness, and most likely they played a larger role than in other coun-
tries with similar fates14 (Karsai, 2007). Therefore, before we deal with the introduction 
of rule-based budgeting to Hungary, it is worth briefly looking beyond our borders.  
It is obvious that in the system of relations of financial policy outlined in the intro-
duction, reaching the desired goals depends not only on establishing the appropriate 
rules, but also on their disciplined observation and enforcement. But in this process 
the human factor and the ability of society to recognise its interests and its will to follow these 
rules play important roles without which the financial stability of a country can scarce-
ly be realised (Kovács, 2016a).
Following the transition to democracy in Hungary, the fiscal policies followed by 
subsequent governments were characterised by bargaining mechanisms, with a plan-
ning and financial management procedure that was built on political promises and 
dogmas. This presented an obstacle for public finance stability and sustainable de-
velopment (Antal, 2004; Csaba, 2007; Karsai, 2007; Lentner, 2008; Matolcsy, 2008; 
Muraközy, 2010 and others).
Consequences measurable by financial indicators 
From time to time (mostly in years close to the elections) the public finance deficit has 
“skyrocketed”; in 2002 and in 2006 it was close to 10 per cent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) (see Figure 2). 
The continuous increase of the measure of government debt expressed as a proportion of 
GDP (government debt rate) up to the introduction of the rule-based fiscal policy in 2010 
was a direct consequence of the high deficit level (see Figure 3).  
In the first half of the 1990s and then, following a temporary decrease, in the 
2000s, the country was heavily burdened not only with the paying back of the soaring 
government debt but also the very expensive financing of the debt (debt service, i.e. the 
interest rate). “In the period of 1993–1999 in Hungary the expenditure on interest 
exceeded the expenditure on education, culture and health care” (György–Veres, 
2016). To this we can add that, even in the years following 2010, servicing the debt 
tied up the same amount – i.e. 8-9 per cent – as that used for financing health care and 
was scarcely less than the 10–11 percent dedicated to education. 
The peaking – especially when compared to the neighbouring countries and also 
to the OECD average – of state redistribution at close to 50 per cent of GDP, was the 
direct consequence of our fiscal policy (Figure 4). 
It was inevitable that the huge amount of withdrawn income (and more specifically, 
the high degree of tax centralisation) that was necessary for state redistribution, en-
couraged tax evasion that, as a consequence, led to a reduction in the number of 
taxpayers, the erosion of the tax base and even to higher tax rates. As a result, private 
sector investments have shrunk. Companies being forced out of the credit market also 
contributed to this trend. 
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Figure 2: Hungarian public finance deficit from 1995 to 2010 calculated according to EU 
methodology (percentage of GDP)
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Figure 3: Government debt to GDP from 1991 to 2015
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Figure 4:  The degree of the revenue centralisation and redistribution of public finance in the 
Visegrád countries (2014) and the OECD average (Consolidated revenues and 
expenditures to GDP)
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Figure 5:  Economic growth of Hungary and the neighbouring countries in the period  
1996–2010 (change compared to the previous year, per cent)
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The aforementioned reasons appearing in Hungary together with a number of 
other factors, like ever-decreasing productivity, led to a more moderate growth, and oc-
casionally even to recession, compared to the neighbouring countries, and the level of 
growth could only be maintained by the continued involvement of external sources 
i.e. indebtedness (see Figure 5).  
Courage was missing from the public finance reforms – consolidation attempts 
– announced by the governments of the period in the aftermath of the transition to 
democracy. Lack of social acceptance and support played a role in their failures or – at 
best – half-successes, as well as the lack of adjustment to the economic viability (tax-
paying ability) of the country when it came to a powerful structural transformation 
and the tasks undertaken by the state. Furthermore, they did not set requirements to 
promote the more efficient utilisation of public funds.    
The above-mentioned oversized public finance and the subsequent “greed” and 
inefficient system of operation exerted a negative effect on the national economy and 
this also contributed to the declining competitiveness of the country.15
Despite the excessive weight of public finance people experienced a continuous 
worsening of the level of public services and thus their quality of life, i.e. their ex-
pectations have not been met despite the promises given in the election campaigns 
(Kovács, 2016a). In addition, the economic crisis of 2008 that started in the money 
markets and expanded to a general crisis further weakened our position thanks to the 
already weak situation of the Hungarian economy. 
Introducing rule-based budgeting in Hungary  
– Antecedents and institutional solutions
By 2006, following the deepening problems of Hungarian public finance that were 
endangering its sustainable financing and damaging the competitiveness of the real 
economy, it had become obvious that the budgetary practice followed ever since the 
transition to democracy had excluded the possibility of stepping on of the path to-
wards sustainable development. The change could not be deferred any longer; a gen-
uine change was needed in fiscal policy. However, the question was what should be the 
contents of such a change. 
Balancing on the edge of fiscal unsustainability led to the recognition that in order 
to maintain the long-term sustainability of public finance, the direction of govern-
ment had to insure, already in the short term, a regulation that was consistent and 
appropriate for the selected scenario as well as fiscal planning in the financial system 
that was “thinking” in the longer term, and independent control overseeing the ob-
servance of the regulations.   
Dual search for a solution (2006–2007)
Experts were seeking solutions in two directions regarding the character of the regulations 
required for fiscal sustainability, as well as the institutional guarantees of their observance. 
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The theses on modernising public finances elaborated by the State Audit Office of 
Hungary assumed that in order to have significant change, the whole management 
of public funds would have to be regulated and made transparent and accountable. 
However, the agreement concerning the necessity and usefulness of comprehensive 
redefinition proved to be insufficient, owing to political divisions and the circum-
stances of a coalition government burdened with internal debates. 
The other professional initiative focused on the most significant cause – the pre-
vention of expenditure overruns – and regarded the adoption of the elements of rule-
based budgeting, which were already successful in international practice, as appropriate 
for solving domestic problems too.  
Accordingly, the development of the framework for rule-based budgeting was 
launched on the initiative of the State Audit Office of Hungary and the Central Bank 
of Hungary.
By the end of year 2008, and in the shadow of the threat of state bankruptcy and 
the pressure of borrowing from the IMF–EU, the Act on Cost-Efficient State Management 
and Fiscal Responsibility was born. Owing to its conception as an intervention mecha-
nism that set limits on expenditure, this act was also referred to as the “Ceiling Act”. 
The act limited the grand total of budget expenditure for the following year (the 
plan for the year 2009 had to be equal to the provision for 2008, but later it could be 
increased by half of the expected rise in the real value of GDP). Besides this, they es-
tablished complicated rules concerning the plannable balance of the budget and the 
envisaged extent of government debt.16
There were also two different plans for the Fiscal Council and its organisation. Al-
though there was agreement on the idea that the chairman of the body should be an 
authority representing the head of state, there were different ideas concerning who 
should be the members of the body.  One plan held that the members should be the 
incumbent presidents of the two financial institutions, i.e. the State Audit Office of 
Hungary and the Central Bank of Hungary, both institutions being independent from 
the government. According to this plan a secretariat with a small staff would take care 
of the general and organisational tasks, as professional support for the decisions made 
by the Council would be ensured by the SAO, which would check the foundations of 
fiscal planning at both the macro- and micro-economic levels as it could rely on its 
independent research staff, and the Central Bank with its existing, and traditionally 
high-level, capacity for macro-economic analysis.17 
The other solution was significantly different from the above plan. In this second 
concept, apart from the authority representing the head of state, members of the 
body would be selected from experts nominated by the heads of the SAO and the 
Central Bank of Hungary. The secretariat would consist of a large number of staff, 
be financed by an independent budget and have significant expertise in macro-eco-
nomic analysis. 
In the end, the second plan was included in the “Ceiling Act” and this prevailed 
until the end of 2010 (Török, 2011). Then, from 2011, there was a return to the first 
plan, with the conditions of the transition being regulated by the 2011 Budget Act.18 
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Following the 2010 general elections, the new Government – enjoying a two-third 
majority in the Parliament – undertook the tasks of reviewing the whole of the legal 
system, and within this public finance, and setting up a new legal framework. This so-
lution opened a new chapter, appropriate to the importance of the issue, with regards 
to the regulation of the rule-based budgeting system. 
The Fundamental Law of Hungary and the Stability Act on rule-based budgeting
The Fundamental Law of Hungary, which was passed on 18th April 2011, dedicated a sep-
arate chapter to public finance. This chapter lays down the budget-making role of the 
National Assembly. Additionally, it states that the management of public finance shall 
be done in a transparent and accountable way, by keeping in mind the requirements 
of legality, expediency and efficiency. It also sets up a barrier for indebtedness, not only 
with regard to overall public finance but also, separately within it, to local authorities.
The Fundamental Law also defined the annually plannable extent of government 
debt when it created the government debt rule.19 According to this rule the National 
Assembly cannot pass a central budget act which would result in government debt 
exceeding half of GDP. As long as government debt exceeds half of GDP, the National 
Assembly can pass only a central budget act that contains the requirement to decrease 
government debt to GDP. 
The Stability Act established a government debt rule not only regarding the planning 
and passing of the budget but also concerning its implementation. It states that as long as gov-
ernment debt rule exceeds half of GDP – with specific exceptions – no borrowing can 
take place in the course of the central budget implementation and no such financial 
obligations can be made as a result of which the proportion of government debt to 
total gross domestic product would increase compared to the previous year. 
The Fundamental Law of Hungary elevated the Fiscal Council (in short: the Coun-
cil or FC), which oversees the observance of fiscal stability, to become one of the 
conditions of the functioning of the Constitution. The Council is a body support-
ing the legislative work of the National Assembly and carries out its duties and tasks 
subordinated to the Fundamental Law and other laws. Among these tasks the FC 
participates in the preparation of the central budget bill; as an organisation support-
ing the legislative work of the National Assembly, on the one hand it examines – gives 
an opinion on – the foundations of the central budget, while on the other hand it gives its 
preliminary consent to the passing of the central budget bill in the interest of the observance 
of the government debt rule. The Council was granted a role as an independent fiscal 
institution with the above-mentioned duties and sphere of authority – i.e. the so-called 
right to veto – together with the accompanying responsibility. 
This solution exceeds the practice of the majority of EU countries where – as we ex-
plained above – the work has mainly an awareness–raising and advisory character, not involv-
ing direct responsibility and tends towards a macro-economic analysis and technical fore-
casting with various reporting rights (that, in a limited way, might be strengthened by the 
relationship of the given institution to the SAO or the Parliament) (Domokos, 2012; 2015).
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The framework for the Council’s duties defined by the Fundamental Law was fur-
ther detailed by the Stability Act (see Figure 6).  
It is the Stability Act that sets forth in detail the rules of procedure for the imple-
mentation of the mandatory duties of the Fiscal Council, including the duties of the 
Government, first and foremost by focusing on the process for enacting the budget 
bill. Thus, if in the course of formulating its opinion on the budget bill the FC ex-
presses its lack of consent, then the Government shall have to confer again and reach 
agreement with the Council. The procedural rule concerning the provisional consent 
of the Council with regard to the bill’s accordance with the government debt rule is 
even tougher: if the Council resorts to using its veto right and rejects giving its provi-
sional consent then the final voting shall have to be postponed and the procedure be 
continued until the Council gives its consent.  
In addition to the above, the main duties of the Council are to express an opinion 
every six months on the implementation of the central budget act and the expected 
trend of government debt. 
The FC monitors the macro economy and the implementation of the budget in 
the context of longer term macro-economic processes. For this purpose – just as when 
expressing an opinion on the budget – the Council relies on the analysis capabilities 
of the SAO and the MNB, and also on the work of research institutes, external experts, 
professional forums and advisory bodies. 
Figure 6: Tasks of the Fiscal Council according to the Stability Act
STABILITY 
ACT
Ensuring the 
financial stability 
and the fiscal 
stability of the 
country
Execution of the 
Fundamental Law
Examination of the 
foundations of the 
Central Budget Act
Promotion the 
reduction of 
government debt
Source: www.kormanyhivatal.hu/download/3/de/20000/6 Stabilitási törv.pdf
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With regard to the other, non-mandatory duties of the Fiscal Council, the Stability Act 
states that it can give its opinion on any issues that are related to the planning and imple-
mentation of the budget, the utilisation of public funds, and the state of public finances. 
From a broader perspective, satisfying social and professional/media interests fits within 
these duties, as well as asking for the opinion of economists, and responding to informa-
tion requests from international organisations, cooperating with the independent fiscal 
institutions of other countries, and, likewise, the promotion of the stability of public 
finances  using the tools of publicity (the Council’s resolutions, annual work plan, other 
documents, and research used for the FC’s work are available on its website).   
Activities of the Fiscal Council and the balancing of public finances
The activities of the FC and the tools at its disposal – not least the body’s strong au-
thority for promoting fiscal discipline, but also the guarantee of its presence –, have 
contributed to the balance-oriented budgetary policy, as a result of which the excessive defi-
cit procedure (EDP) against Hungary was terminated in 2013, and  the benchmarking 
parameters of public finance management have been realised, on the basis of which 
it became possible, in 2016, for international credit rating organisations to return 
Hungary to  investment-grade status.  
Some decisive resolutions of the Fiscal Council can be linked to this process:
– In 2012, the FC objected to the macro-economic trajectory and the targeted defi-
cit in the 2013 central budget bill. As a consequence, a new proposal was made that 
amended the macro-economic background, the targeted deficit and included addi-
tional revenue (thus concerning the tax system) and expenditure-affecting measures. 
– In 2013, in its opinion on the 2014 central budget bill, the FC identified risks 
both on the revenue and expenditure sides. Thus it considered it justified that strict 
financial management is followed at all levels of public finances to ensure that balance 
requirements are met.
– In 2014, in the case of the 2015 central budget bill, the FC focused its attention 
on the necessity of “fending off” those external conditions that threatened the imple-
mentation of the macro-economic trajectory.  
– In 2015, with regard to the 2016 central budget bill, the Council pointed out that 
the observance of the government debt rule (the debt formula stipulated by the Sta-
bility Act) was facing challenges (as a result of these challenges both the balance and 
the growth of public finances were in danger) and recommended the amendment of 
the formula. The National Assembly adopted a new government debt rule, also as a 
consequence of the FC proposal.
– In 2016, the Council gave a positive evaluation of the 2017 central budget bill 
thanks to the step taken towards a balanced budget (the separation and deficit of the 
operational and accumulation budgets was shown only in case of the latter). At the 
same time the FC called the attention to the fact that the requirement regarding the 
so-called structural deficit had not been met. 
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The stability of Hungarian finances as the basis of growth
Growth determining the stability of the country and public finances has been pre-
sent since 2013. It should be stressed that “the years of 2014 and 2015 were the first 
two years, ever since the early 1990s, when the Hungarian economy was able to grow 
without being followed by the growth of government debt and the external debt of 
the economy” (György–Veres, 2016:380). It is auspicious that economic activity has 
strengthened and that economic growth in the region exceeds the average of the euro 
area (see Figure 7).
Figure 7: Economic growth in the countries of Central Eastern Europe and of the euro area
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Source: 2016 spring forecast of the European Commission
The improvement of the government debt balance at the same time stimulates 
growth both in Hungary and in the neighbouring countries. It is the success of our 
rule-based budgetary policy that it is manifested not only in the decreasing trend in 
the public finance deficit but also in the fact that ever since 2012 our primary balance 
has been continuously positive, in contrast to the previous years when we were able to 
produce such a favourable result only for a year (Figure 8). 
As a result of the marked improvement in the effectiveness of revenue collection, 
the adequate control of expenditures and the  subsequent improving of the deficit in-
dicators, after 2010 the government debt rate has been improved every year (as show 
in Figure 3). With the improving balance, the costs of financing the budget decrease. 
Cheaper financing then liberates resources for the economy and for society and thus 
represents a factor for growth. From the aspect of the “vulnerability” of the country, 
the spectacular fall of the ration of foreign currency within government debt is espe-
cially favourable (see Figure 9).
57
Civic Review · Vol. 13, Special Issue, 2017
Figure 8:  Hungary’s budget deficit, net interest expenditures, and primary balance to GDP
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Figure 9:  Hungarian government debt denominated in foreign currency and the yields of 
government securities 
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Instead of a summary
The characteristic of the “Hungarian model” that was renewed in 2011 is that, in 
order to prevent the earlier fiscal indiscipline, the FC was granted constitutional au-
thority (right to veto) on the acceptance of the budgets (and their respective amend-
ments). Apart from this it is also a characteristic feature of the Council that thanks to 
is budget-related constitutional authority, the body primarily deals with the stability 
risks of the current and the following year, utilises medium-term outlook and forecast 
data t, and does not bring them to the level of a corporate decision. 
Generally speaking, the Hungarian system can successfully function not only be-
cause of its strict regulations, simple and transparent principles for fighting govern-
ment debt and overseeing the observance of these regulations, but also because of 
its solutions, its effect on mitigating expenditure overruns, its awareness raising and 
confidence-building strength and its durability. In this way, it can contribute to the 
stabilisation of the country, to its sustainable development, the improvement of the 
country’s economic competitiveness and, ultimately, the advancement of the nation 
and the citizens of the country (Kovács, 2016b).
By the application of the elements of rule-based budgeting and the operation of 
the Fiscal Council, and also owing to the confirmation of the related requirements 
in the Fundamental Law and the Stability Act that made the regulations more trans-
parent and consistent, the balance of public finances in the years following 2011 has 
clearly improved with respect to the deficit and debt indicators. Fiscal stability makes 
it possible for public finances to increasingly contribute to economic development. 
Competitiveness indicators20 even today lag behind those of the Visegrád group of 
countries. Among a series of weaknesses, however, those related to the low effective-
ness, excessive consumption and lack of financial stability of Hungarian public fi-
nances are no longer present today. These serious and determinant factors were re-
sponsible for the withdrawal of resources necessary for the economy and the dramatic 
fall of competitiveness in the 2004–2010 period. 
The improvement of our balance situation affects our national competitiveness 
in a positive way. Further continuing the idea of linking competitiveness to the ma-
terial and intellectual progress of our citizens, one must agree with a definition 
from Magdolna Csath that: “the economy is competitive when the abilities of the 
nation are useful and in the longer run keep gaining strength continuously, and 
when companies produce high added value, and as a consequence of these factors 
the standard of living and quality of life of the individuals keep improving” (Csath, 
2016:5–6.).
Concerns the answer to the question “how to proceed” let me invoke once again 
the thoughts of László György and József Veress: “After having fended off direct dan-
gers we can start developing those efficiency-improving and innovative factors that 
are able to set a solid foundation for competitiveness and economic growth […] first 
of all developing the following fields: vocational training, adult education, higher 
education, innovation, optimisation of the coordinating mechanisms of the economy 
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and decreasing of the bureaucratic and administrative burdens of market operators” 
(György–Veress, 2016: 380).
Disciplined fiscal policy and making the work of public finance supply system more 
effective and efficient must contribute continuously to the future success of our na-
tional economy. There are plenty of tasks still to do for the Fiscal Council by contribut-
ing to the strengthening of fiscal responsibility.
Notes
1  The author thanks László Kékesi and Sándor Varga, advisors to the Chairman of the Fiscal Council, for 
their contributions to writing this article.
2  We can also regard the Maastricht criteria as obligatory and uniformly used “numerical and procedural 
rules”. Let’s think about the stipulated 3 per cent deficit limit or the goal of keeping government debt 
at 60 per cent of GDP, the obligatory decrease of the part of the deficit leading to it or that of the part 
above the limit by 1/20th annually and the independent fiscal institution of the EU Commission, the 
European Fiscal Board established as an advisory body of the EU zone countries. Members of this body 
were appointed in October 2016, a year after its establishment, by the EU Commission and it started 
working in practice following this.       
3  Paragraph (1) of Article N of the Foundation of our Fundamental law (“Hungary shall observe the 
principle of balanced, transparent and sustainable budget management.”) and Articles 36, 37 and 44 of 
the chapter The State.  
4  Act CXCIV of 2011 on Hungary’s Economic Stability.
5  The introduction and application of rule-based budgeting has a wide range theoretical literature. Ad-
ditionally the European Commission, and lately the cooperation forum of the independent fiscal in-
stitutions of the EU countries have also published documents. This chapter was prepared using these 
materials.  
6  Rule-based budgeting and financing based on it carries the better harmony of tasks and resources and 
undoubtedly mitigates the cyclic nature of the budget (Kopits, 2013). The lessons of the crisis comple-
mented this “classic function” by proving that the introduction of rule based budgeting can be one of 
the tools of crisis management (Reinhart–Rogoff, 2010; Kovács, Á., 2013).
7  As regards the constitutional rating of institutions overseeing the observance of relevant rules, inde-
pendence from the government is a generally prevailing requirement, although we see Poland as the 
“odd one out” where the institution was established as part of the executive power. A well-known conse-
quence is loss of reputation/credibility as a sanction applied by fiscal institutions. In the case of Poland 
we can see the option of legal sanctions (for example the renegotiation of the budget), while financial 
sanctions (for example, the suspension of EU resources) can be used in the countries of the euro area 
(Franco, 2011).
8  Stricter fiscal rules were applied after 2008 and institutions were dedicated to overseeing the observance 
of such rules in Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria and Italy. The system was further enhanced 
in the countries that already had such institutions (in Sweden in 2007, in Denmark and the United 
Kingdom in 2010). 
9  By its Resolution No. 8000 issued on 21 October 2015 the European Commission decided to establish 
the institution, while a decision on its member was made only a year later, in October 2016.
10  Due to the short time that had passed since its establishment, naturally we don’t yet have evaluable expe-
riences regarding its operation and the perception of the body about its mission. The cooperation and 
consultation forum of the independent fiscal institutions of the EU countries that was created about one 
and a half years ago as a self-contracting and professional-consultation forum is looking for opportuni-
ties to establish a mutual exchange of experiences with the European Fiscal Boards as soon as possible 
to share best practices.  
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11  The Czech Republic does not use any elements of the rule-based fiscal framework. The fact that, for 
political reasons, the former Czechoslovakia never received external resources and the transition to 
democracy took place in a country that had a relatively developed economy, low living standards but 
minimal level of indebtedness all played an important part is this. The situation is somewhat similar in 
Poland, where they had been successfully using the fiscal policy and procedural regulations prior to the 
crisis and they do not see the need to establish an IFI. 
12  As regards the concepts of the professional backgrounds of independent fiscal institutions, their con-
stitutional status has no international (European) “best practice”. What is important is the capability of 
institutions to maintain rules, which can be realised in the various countries by lining up constitutional 
instruments of differencing strengths, by different values of trust and credibility (prestige), by relying on 
professional support of different organisational backgrounds, and by various constitutional and institu-
tional tools. The guarantees to keep the budget deficit in control and to prevent expenditure overruns, 
and the rules created with the aim of limiting investment expenditures, (Benczes–Váradi, 2011) can be 
interpreted together with the state organisation and fiscal system of the given country (Török, 2011). 
There are a number of examples in international practice in which analyses serving as the foundation 
of the body’s decisions are provided by experts from the business sector or other, independent organisa-
tions – SAI, central bank, etc. Among the countries of the European Union France, Finland, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Italy rely on their respective SAIs while the Slovakian and Austrian IFIs chose their Central 
Banks as a background. In the case of the latter, however, we also have to note that in Austria there is an 
additional institute with a parliamentary background that oversees rule-based budgeting. 
13  Such can be, for example, when the IFI prepares the macro-economic forecast that serves as the basis of 
the budget bill, gives its opinion on the budget bills and the defined parameters (government debt to 
GDP, deficit ceiling, etc.).
14  In 2006 Gábor Karsai wrote: “The amplitude of domestic political cycles in Hungary appears to be 
more powerful than what is usual in the older member-states of the EU. Very likely part of this is the 
consequence of the greater tensions caused by the transformation process. The other reason is the con-
sequence of more modest democratic traditions. […] As regards the Hungarian economic and privatiza-
tion policy we clearly have to differentiate between the declared principles and practice expressed in the 
election campaigns, and the government programme and the laws. This has two important elements. 
On the one hand, the processes often went on without parliamentary regulations.” (Karsai, 2006:510)
15  Naturally the problem is manifested in a far wider context however, discussion of this – especially the 
impact assessment of the factors of production efficiency – exceeds the frame of the present article).
16  Act LXXV of 2008.
17  In order to ensure the technical conditions for the operation of the secretariat with a small staff it can be 
attached either to the SAO or the Central Bank of Hungary, although it can be also expedient if the Of-
fice of the National Assembly supplies the technical background for the operation. There are examples 
of each solution in international practice.  
18  The changing concepts of institutional building and grasp of mission exceed the frame of the present 
article. A more detailed explanation can be found in the following document: “The Fiscal Council in 
the Hungarian Fundamental Law, Draft of Institutional Development and the European Practice” (Ko-
vács, 2016b).
19  Paragraphs (4) and (5) Article 36 of the Fundamental Law. In Hungary government debt was concre-
tised by the Stability Act. According to the original wording that came into law in 2015 and was used for 
the first time for the 2016 central budget, the planned amount of government debt by the end of the fol-
lowing year was able to grow by the amount of half of the difference between the growth rate of inflation 
and real GDP. However, this was unenforceable and thus this requirement was amended (the movement 
of economic growth and inflation in opposite directions would have resulted in a restraint on growth). 
As a result of the 2015 amendments this rule is valid only in cases of an inflation target exceeding 3 per 
cent and, at the same time, economic growth predicted above 3 per cent. In any other case, the goal is 
set at reaching at least a 0.1 per cent decrease in the debt indicator. At the same time, the decrease in 
the debt indicator can be even larger by reaching the goal set by the public finance law, i.e. by reaching 
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the targeted budget deficit in the medium term. Diversions from the above requirements are allowed 
only in cases of the introduction of a special law, to the extent of mitigating the consequences of the 
factors calling for the introduction of such law, or, in the case of a lasting and significant recession of the 
national economy, and only to the extent necessary to restore normal conditions.
20  Attila Chikán wrote: “Quite a strong correlation exists between productivity and competitiveness. It 
is rather unlikely to be wrong when we say that one of the important factors of Hungary’s significant 
falling behind is that in the rank of 33 OECD countries merely five countries are behind us and our 
country’s indicator does not reach half the level of the data for the USA data and 60 per cent of 
the OECD average. A general lagging behind is inevitable with such real outputs. It is an especially 
regretful fact that the productivity growth rate of productivity is also showing a downward tendency” 
(Chikán, 2014).
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